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LAW, SOCIETY, AND RECEPTION: THE
VISION OF ALAN WATSON
M.H. Hoeflich*
THE EVOLUTION OF LAW. By Alan Watson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1985. Pp. xi, 156. $17.50.
Professor Alan Watson is known as the Anglo-American world's
preeminent expert on preclassical and classical Roman law. In recent
years he has turned his formidable analytic skills and encyclopedic
knowledge of European legal traditions to a broader jurisprudential
topic: how and why the law develops as it does in any particular society. His latest book, The Evolution ofLaw, carries on the discussion of
this topic begun in earlier books, such as his Legal Transplants 1 and
Sources of Law, Legal Change, and Ambiguity. 2 It is a brief but brilliant exposition of two basic questions. First, to what extent is the
development of law autonomous and independent of societal needs
and demands? Second, how can one explain, within the context of this
relationship between law and society, why so many legal systems borrow extensively, in the matter of specific substantive legal rules as well
as broad jurisprudential categories, from other alien legal systems?
It is clear that Professor Watson's concerns stem, to a large extent,
from a question which has troubled legal historians and legal philosophers for centuries. That is: how does one explain the puzzling phenomenon of legal reception? In its broadest sense, reception is the
process in law by which one legal system adopts substantive or procedural rules developed by and native to another legal system. In its
broadest form, reception may involve the wholesale adoption of an
entire alien legal system, such as the modern Turkish adoption of
Swiss law, or it may involve narrower borrowings, such as the adoption of European civil law principles into American water law in the
early nineteenth century or of classical Roman law principles of obligations into the interstices of the modern continental legal systems of
France and Germany. It is also easy to understand Professor Watson's fascination with reception. No student of Roman law can ignore
its Nachleben; for two thousand years the bleached bones of this dead
society's laws have continued to inspire, influence, and shape the ma• Professor of Law and University Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law. - Ed.
Research for this essay was supported by a grant from the Workman Research Fund at the
University of Illinois and a grant from the Illinois State Bar Foundation.
1. A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974).
2. A. WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY (1985).
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jority of the world's legal systems and, indeed, in many cases, Roman
law has been revivified in wholly new societal contexts.
But reception also poses a fundamentally troubling jurisprudential
issue. If law arises directly and solely from the needs of its particular
national and societal context, how then can one explain the adoption
of an alien system or its principles unless, coincidentally, their societal
context closely parallels that of the adoptive system to the point where
they are interchangeable? To answer this, we must begin by understanding that we are all of us children of the early nineteenth-century
German legal scholar Friedrich Carl von Savigny and his vision of
law. 3 Savigny, under the influence of his own mentor, Hugo, founded
what has come to be called the "historical school" of jurisprudence.4
In a large number of influential works, including his pamphlet Vom
Beruf unsrer Zeit fiir Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 5 and his
monumental Geschichte des Riimischen Rechts im Mittelalter, 6 Savigny
argued that one cannot understand law unless it is viewed in its historical context. By this Savigny meant that to understand a particular
legal rule one must know its origins. For Savigny, the origins of law
rested in society, specifically in the Volk And thus one of Savigny's
American disciples, O.W. Holmes, could argue that the life of the law
is experience not logic.7 It is the historical experience of a people
which gives rise to its laws.
It is difficult reconcile the pure version of Savigny's vision of law
and legal origins with the fact of reception. This difficulty did not
bother Savigny. 8 On the contrary, it was Savigny's political motivation to oppose reception in the form of codification that led him to
write his first legal pamphlet, the Beruf. 9 But if we, as children of

to

3. On Savigny and his importance, see G. KLEINHEYER & J. SHRC>DER, DEUTSCHE JURIS·
TEN AUS FONF JAHRHUNDERTEN 23()..36 (1976); G. MARINI, SAVIGNY E IL METODO DELLA
SCIENZA GIURIDICA (1966); see also J. R.EDDIE, HISTORICAL NOTICES OF THE ROMAN LAW
AND OF THE RECENT PROGRESS OF ITS STUDY IN GERMANY 98-99, 111-14 (1826);
Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Historical School of Law, 53 LAW Q. REV. 326 (1937).
4. See J. REooIE, supra note 3, at 99; Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz
to Langdel/, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 106-08 (1986).
5. F. SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSRER ZEIT FUR GESETZGEBUNG UNO RECHTSWISSEN·
SCHAFT (Heidelberg 1814). This work has been translated into English as F. SAVIGNY, OF THE
VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (A. Hayward trans. 1831).
6. F. SAVIGNY, GESCHICHTE DES Rt>MISCHEN RECHTS IM MITTELALTER (2d ed. 18341851) (translated as F. SAVIGNY, THE HISTORY OF THE ROMAN LAW DURING THE MIDDLE
AGES (1829 & photo. reprint 1979)).
7. 0.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
8. If, in fact, one accepts that Savigny's vision that the Volk is the only legitimate source of
law, then any law imported from an alien society (and, thus, an alien Volk) ought to be illegiti·
mate and out of tune with society's needs. Of course, in its "pure" or extreme form this theory
can be highly dangerous; witness the adoption of Savigny's arguments by the Nazis during the
heyday of the Third Reich; see Lecture by M. Hoeflich, delivered at the 1986 AALS Legal History Workshop in New Orleans (entitled "Ideology and Legal History") (transcript on file at the
Michigan Law Review).
9. F. Savigny, supra note 5.
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Savigny, firmly believe that law does, indeed, derive solely from current social and political necessities, how can we also explain the constant borrowing of laws by most legal systems from alien systems?
This borrowing, obviously, unless it itself derives from perceived societal needs and demands, directly conflicts with the historical theory of
the social origins of law. 10 Professor Watson in his Evolution of Law
provides a mediating paradigm to explain and solve this seeming conceptual anomaly.
Professor Watson's paradigm for the relationship between law and
society, while it is not fundamentally opposed to Savigny's, does certainly differ from it. Watson proposes that first, even in primitive systems based primarily on custom, systems where one would expect the
closest ties between law and society, legal rules often do not "fit the
society particularly well" (p. 116). In more advanced societies, where
the formal sources of law extend beyond custom to legislated statute
and, above all, to the development of case law and professional literature, while societal needs have a role, the far more important factor in
lawmaking is professional tradition. Central to Professor Watson's
theory is the notion that where a professional legal class develops (and
he - like I - would argue that such a class developed early in Western Europe) it is this group's professional traditions and professional
concerns which shape the law - especially private law - far more
than any societal input. In essence, Watson proposes a two-tier lawcreative structure. First, there is societal demand. When this becomes
great enough, those with law-creative power (legislators, kings, judges)
create a legal rule. Once created, this rule is then preserved and developed by the professional legal elite. Thus, beyond causing the lawcreative process to begin, society has only indirect input.
Fundamentally, The Evolution of Law is a brilliantly constructed
series of case studies designed to test this two-tier theory oflawmaking
and of the central role played by professional legal traditions. To evaluate Watson's theory fairly, therefore, it is necessary to examine these
case studies for accuracy and to ask whether they are persuasive.
Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book is the third on
"The Cause of the Reception of Roman Law," which focuses primarily on Western Europe in the early Middle Ages (pp. 66-97). This is a
phenomenon which has puzzled and troubled scholars since the sixteenth century.II Essentially, the factual matter is clear. The Roman
10. That the borrowing itself derives from the Vo/ksgeist is, of course, a possibility, but the
history of reception suggests that societal demands for reception are few. See text following note
30 infra.
11. Works on the reception of Roman law in early medieval Europe are too numerous to list.
Fundamentally, all scholars are agreed that some form of Roman law was received in Gaul, but
the extent of this reception and the precise Roman and Byzantine sources remain controversial.
Two classic studies of this problem are P. KOSCHAKER, EUROPA UNO DAS ROMISCHE RECHT
(1947); P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1909).
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domination of Western Europe in a politico-military sense began to
decline drastically by the end of the fourth century A.D. 12 By the fifth
century any real central Roman control of the Western provinces was
chimerical. Government was local. Nevertheless, Roman governmental, legal, and social structures were firmly rooted in the Gallic soil,
and demographically, the Gallo-Roman population of the West was
large (larger in fact than the Germanic tribes). Thus, when the Emperor Theodosius II ordered the making of an official code, which was
published in 438 A.D. as the Codex Theodosianus, 13 it rapidly became
the governing law of the Western provinces. At the same time, as a
result of the political and military retreat of Roman forces from Gaul
and the increasing isolation of the Eastern Emperors at Constantinople, the powerful Germanic tribes settling in Gaul (the Ostrogoths,
the Visigoths, the Burgundians, the Salian Franks, and others) began
to exert their political and military dominance. By the beginning of
the sixth century, the Gallic provinces were firmly under Germanic
control. Importantly, the Germanic kings did not repudiate Roman
legal institutions. On the contrary, the Germanic tribes generally
adopted these alien laws. This legal adoption took several forms. The
Germans believed law to be personal rather than territorial and thus
they adopted the Roman law in toto for their Gallo-Roman subjects. 14
The best known of these codes, the Lex Romana-Visigothorum,
promulgated by the Visigothic King Alaric II, coexisted with a second
Germanic Code applicable to Visigoths, fragments of which are still
extant and now known to us as the Codex Euricianus. 15 What is crucial, however, in terms of borrowing and reception is that the Codex
Euricianus, a Germanic code for Germans, was itself Romanized, by
incorporating substantive Roman legal principles into it. This same
Romanization occurred in the Codex Euricianus' successor code, the
great Leges Visigothorum. 16 Indeed, throughout early medieval Gaul,
12. See A. JONES, THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE (1964); R. MACMULLEN, ROMAN GOVERN·
MENT'S RESPONSE TO CRISIS A.D. 235-337 (1976).
13. The standard modern edition of the Codex Theodosianus is T. MOMMSEN & P. KRUE·
GER, THEODOSIAN! LIBRI XVI (reprint 1970). There is an English translation by c. PHARR, THE
THEODOSIAN CODE (1952). On the use of the Theodosianus see A. de Wretschko, De Usu
Breviarii Alariciani, in T. MOMMSEN & P. KRUEGER, supra, at cccvii. On the manuscript evi·
dence, see also Hoeflich, Law Beyond Byzantium: The Evidence of Palimpsests, 1987 ZEIT·
SCHRIFf DER SAVIGNY STIFfUNG FOR RECHTSGESCHICHTE, GERMANISTISCHE ABTEILUNG
(forthcoming).
14. See generally s. GUTERMAN, FROM PERSONAL TO TERRITORIAL LAW 215-21 (1972); P.
King, King Chindasvind and the First Territorial Law-Code of the Visigothic Kingdom, in V1s1GOTHIC SPAIN: NEW APPROACHES 131-57 (E. James ed. 1980).
15. The modern edition of the Codex Euricianus is K. ZEUMER, Legum codicis euricia11i
fragmenta, in 1 MONUMENTA GERMANIAE HISTORICA, LEGES VJSIGOTHORUM 1 (reprint
1973).
16. The modern edition of the Leges Visigothorum is 1 K. ZEUMER, supra note 15, at 33.
The best study of the Leges Visigothorum in English is P. KING, LAW & SOCIETY IN THE VtSI•
GOTHIC KINGDOM (1972).
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the Lex Romana-Visigothorum and the Codex Theodosianus on which
it was based were revered and cited (as lex Romana) and used as a
source for substantive legal rules to supplement and occasionally supplant the Germanic customs.17 By the seventh century throughout
southern and southeastern Gaul, Roman legal principles had been
widely "received," and even in northern Gaul strong evidence of Roman legal ideas was present in the Germanic codes. 18
The question one must ask, of course, is whether this "reception"
of Roman law took place for the reasons outlined by Professor Watson. This is somewhat difficult to evaluate, for we do not have as
much historical data about what early medieval society was like as we
might wish. Certainly, it is fair to say that one might doubt whether
early medieval society demanded the sorts of sophisticated commercial
law rules which one finds contained in the Roman law sources from
which they borrowed. Yet such Roman commercial laws were
adopted, for instance, into the Leges Visigothorum. 19 In recent literature, there has been a tendency to argue that early medieval kings borrowed from Roman law, even to the extent of writing their Germanic
customs in Latin, because of the appeal of the Roman model and the
almost magical aura attached to anything Roman. 20 Yet, contemporary sources would suggest also that the early Germans felt a fierce
pride in their Germanic heritage. For instance, one early medieval
Latin poet, Venantius Fortunatus, lauded his Germanic royal patron
not by praising him solely for his Roman virtues, but, instead, by emphasizing how he incorporated the best of both the Roman and the
German worlds. 21 In the law codes, the reception of Roman rules
would seem to be attributable to a similar desire to combine the best of
both worlds, Roman and German, and the aspiration of the
lawmakers to use Roman law for their own purposes.
This selective adoption of Roman models is, in fact, characteristic
of the reception of Roman law in early medieval Europe. Indeed, it is
characteristic of virtually all legal receptions that they do not involve a
17. See Hoeflich, supra note 13.
18. See, e.g., Gaudemet, Code Theodosien et Breviaire d'Alaric, in 4 Srum IN ONORE DI
GIUSEPPE GROSSO 359 (G. Giappichelli ed. 1971); see also Nehlsen, Zur Aktualitiit und Ejfektivitiit germanischer Rechtsaufzeichnungen, in RECHT UND SCHRIFT IM MIITELALTER 449 (P.
Classen ed. 1977); J. GAUDEMET, LE BREVIAIRE D'ALARIC ET LES EPITOME (Ius Romanum
Medii Aevi 1, 2 b aa [3, 1965).
19. See e.g., Legis Visigothorum 5.4 in K. ZEUMER, supra note 15, at 217, 226 ("De commutationibus et venditionibus").
20. See P. Wormald, Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis: Legislation and Germanic Kingship
from Euric to Cnut, in P. SAWYER & I. WOOD, EARLY MEDIEVAL KINGSHIP 105-38 (reprint
1979); see also Lecture by M. Hoeflich, delivered at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the Medieval
Academy of America (entitled "Law and the Commonweal in the Middle Ages: Ideology and
Pragmatism") (forthcoming).
21. See Hoeflich, Between Gothia and Romania: The Image of the King in the Poetry of
Venantius Fortunatus, 5 RES PUBLICA LITTERARUM 123 (1982).
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total, unthinking adoption of an alien legal system, but, on the contrary, a reflective and selective adoption and adaptation of the alien
rules. What is important here is to determine, if we can, why particular rules were received. Was it a crying societal need that led to the
domestication of Roman rules amongst the barbarian German tribes?
Or was it, rather, the influence of a professional legal elite?
We know, at least, that in the early Middle Ages in Gaul there was
no large cadre of professionally trained lawyers who could direct the
reception of Roman law into the Germanic states. However, there
were royal counsellors principally concerned with legal matters who
seem to have kept alive some sense of legal professionalism and who
were primarily responsible for integrating substantive Roman legal
rules with Germanic customs. 22 Indeed, to a large extent these counsellors appear to have been of Gallo-Roman stock and may well have
had some rudimentary training in German and Roman law. 23 Were
they responding to perceived societal needs in adopting Roman law?
Or, were they simply fleshing out their law books with no true interest
in the substantive rules themselves or in society? Clearly it was the
former. Societal needs, however, must be understood as meaning
those things which the small, semi-educated legal elite believed society
to need.
To this point, certainly, Professor Watson's views would agree
with those of most traditional scholars that the interests of early medieval society, as defined by the narrow elite, motivated the adoption of
Roman rules. Thus, for example, Ostrogothic laws tended to incorporate Roman rules on buildings, roads, and monuments, for the new
Germanic rulers of Italy discovered that they had inherited an infrastructure with which they had never before been concerned and for
which they had no Germanic laws. The Roman legal rules provided a
handy source of useful regulations and obviated the need to formulate
new ones. It was far easier to borrow already established rules than
attempt to formulate new ones de novo. Similarly, the Visigoths in
Spain adopted Roman legal rules on the treatment of captives since,
again, these rules were clear, well thought out, and addressed a thenpressing problem.
What is crucial to Professor Watson's vision of law, however,
comes after this initial reception. These Roman rules, once adopted,
continued to be included in Germanic legal compilations, and these
compilations themselves tended to be adopted and adapted cross-na22. See P. RICHE, EDUCATION AND CULTURE JN THE BARBARIAN WEST: SIXTH THROUGH
EIGHTH CENTURIES 214-18 (J. Contreni trans. 1st ed. 1976); see also P. RICHE, ENSEJGNEMENT
DU DROJT EN GAULE DU VIE AU XIE SJECLE (Ius Romanum Medii Aevi 1, 5 b bb, 1965). On
the late ancient heritage, see F. WJEACKER, ALLGEMEINE ZusrA.NDE UND RECHTSZUSfANDE
GEGEN ENDE DES WESTR6MJSCHEN REICHS (Ius Romanum Medii Aevi 1, 2 a, 1963).
23. See P. RICHE, EDUCATION AND CULTURE JN THE BARBARIAN WEST: SIXTH THROUGH
EIGHTH CENTURIES, supra note 22.
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tionally for centuries throughout Western Europe. Were they at all
times fulfilling a perceived and current societal need? Professor Watson would argue that they were not. Rather, by virtue of having become established legal rules, they became the property of legists and as
such came to have a life independent of immediate social demands.
Indeed, this would seem to have been the case. They continued to be
compiled and adopted because they had become part of a legal canon
accepted by legal professionals. The legal history of early medieval
Europe in this regard tends to bear out Professor Watson's theories.
The Visigothic laws continued to be cited after the demise of the Visigothic kingdom in Spain as well as in the territories of the Carolingians and Ottonians in what was later to become France and Germany
(pp. 91-92). In these kingdoms, they were adopted almost exclusively
through the active intervention of legal specialists; individuals doing
what Karl Llewellyn would have called "law jobs." They were
adopted primarily because they were by then traditionally viewed as
"good" Roman law rules, and if a custom were lacking in the native
tradition, a jurist would cite such a canonical legal rule. Why? Perhaps, in part, to appeal to the authority of the old Empire. Perhaps,
also, because jurists who could cite Roman law were considered
learned and gained prestige. Perhaps also, if not primarily, because it
was easier than formulating a new rule, and because the task of formulation was left to such legal professionals.
Does this mean that the jurists and royal lawmakers of the early
Middle Ages ignored popular needs? Surely not. Rather it means, as
Professor Watson has suggested, that the interconnection between law
and society is not so close as to preclude borrowing from alien systems. Reception is both possible and explicable so long as one recognizes that the most important group for reception of legal rules is the
legal elite. Or, put differently, reception is principally a phenomenon
associated with contexts where law-creative authority is vested in professionals or quasi-professionals.
Thus, Professor Watson's theory of the relation between law and
society does help to explain both why and where reception takes place,
and is consistent with what we know of early medieval Europe. In
fact, another, more modern test case, one less well-known, could also
be cited: the reception of Roman law in the common law jurisdictions
of the United States in the early nineteenth century. Roman law in
nineteenth-century America was not received in the way it was in seventh- and eighth-century Gaul. However, between 1790 and 1850 Roman and civil law made its appearance in most American doctrinal
legal writings. 24 For instance, the Roman and civilian components
24. See M. Hoeflich, Roman Law & the Development of Anglo-American Jurisprudence in
the Nineteenth Century (forthcoming).

1090

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:1083

loom large in Joseph Story's works. 25 The same may be said of Chancellor Kent's Commentaries, as well as of the writings of South Carolinian jurist and U.S. Attorney General, Hugh Swinton Legare. 26 In
the case law too, especially in areas such as conflict of laws where
domestic rules were lacking, Roman and civilian learning is dominant.
One sees this, for instance, in the decisions of Judge Theophilus Parsons of Massachusetts and in early Virginia state court cases. 27 Could
native American rules have been formulated without recourse to Roman law? Almost certainly Story or Kent, had they felt it necessary,
could have avoided ever referring to other legal systems. However,
they believed that Roman and civil law were useful and that the rules
they contained could be profitably adopted. 28 And, once adopted,
these rules became part of the American legal tradition. Was this reception a direct response to social demand for the use of alien rules?
Again, clearly not; yet this "mini-reception" was not antithetical to
society's demands, and it was effectuated by the legal elite.
Ultimately, to understand Professor Watson's vision of the relationship between law and society and of legal development as a process
quasi-independent of societal needs, we can, perhaps, recall a statement of 0.W. Holmes in The Common Law. For Holmes, law, especially case law, does need to "correspond with the actual feelings and
demands of the community" when it is first adopted. 29 But, as time
passes, according to Holmes, the reasons for adoption of a rule may
pass, and "as the clavicle in the cat only tells of the existence of some
earlier creature to which a collarbone was useful, precedents survive in
the law long after the use they once served is at an end and the reason
for them has been forgotten." 30 What Holmes was getting at is simple:
eventually a legal rule must be consonant with society's wants, but it
can take a while for a rule which is no longer socially necessary or
desirable to be rejected. The crux of the Holmesian argument about
case law is also the key to the Watsonian view of reception. There are
really two parties vitally interested in law: society at large and the
legal professionals. No law can be adopted and maintained indefinitely
directly against the will of society. To the extent, however, that society is divided and pluralistic and the legal professionals who tend to
specialize in legal activities are unified and share common goals and
25. See Hoeflich, John Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives on the
Utility of the Civil Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 36, 56-76 (1985).
26. See M. Hoeflich, supra note 24; M. O'BRIEN, A CHARACTER OF HUGH LEGARE 25-28
(1985); see also Hoeflich, supra note 4, at 112-14.
27. See, e.g., Pearsall v. Dwight (1806), reprinted in T. PARSONS, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 2-5 (1836); see also Bryson, The Use ofRoman Law in Virginia Courts, 28 AM.
]. LEGAL HIST. 135 (1984).
28. Hoeflich, supra note 25, at 74-77.
29. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 41.
30. Id. at 35.
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perceptions, the legal professionals have a great deal of power both to
adopt initially and to preserve and maintain legal rules to which society is indifferent or only mildly antagonistic. Furthermore, society as a
whole is indifferent to most private law rules. Thus, it is Watson's
great insight to realize that reception is fundamentally an elitist phenomenon, in which society plays only a small role initially. For instance, one might argue that Roman law failed to be received in
England to any great extent, not because it was contrary to the needs
of English society, but, rather, because it was contrary to the interests
of English jurists and lawyers. Where it was not contrary, as in certain commercial law areas, it was received. 31
In fact, Watson's vision of legal development is not contrary at all
to Savigny's when closely examined. Watson understands that legal
development is a dynamic process in which law professionals and lay
society must interact over time. The professionals cannot totally ignore societal needs. Thus, we find far less reception of substantive
Roman legal rules concerning marriage into the early medieval Germanic codes where Germanic social practices differed radically from
Roman. 32 And, equally, we find little use of Roman penal concepts in
nineteenth-century American law treatises, when such concepts were
opposed to then-modem ideas of morality and crime. Similarly, the
Roman law of slavery was probably not very influential in the formulation of American slave law. On the other hand, general society is
not particularly interested in most areas of the law and is quite willing
to tum over responsibility to an established legal elite. Until such time
as the rules formulated by such an elite conflict with cherished societal
beliefs, the legal professionals will be permitted to do very much what
they want to do with those rules. So long as they don't step beyond
the limits of what society will accept, they can indeed follow their own
logic.
What one needs to add to Professor Watson's vision of this dynamic relationship amongst law, society, and legal professionals is a
series of definitions and categories. First, it seems relatively clear that
the dynamic will be more flexible with some legal subjects than with
others. Thus, family law, the law of marriage and succession, would
seem to be one where the dominance of general social attitudes over
professional traditions will be great, while the subject of legal procedure, that area of the law of most concern to legal professionals, will
be of least interest to society at large and most autonomous. It is
likely, then, that there will be a greater chance of reception of alien
31. On the reception of Roman law into English law, Scrutten's study remains useful. See T.
(1885).

SCRUTIEN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN LAW ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND
32.

See J.

GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN EUROPE

(1983). Some Roman rules about marriage were adopted, however, with changes. See generally
A. WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 85 (1985).
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rules in those legal subject areas which are most autonomous, such as
procedure.
Two interesting examples in this area may be mentioned. The first
example actually involves a refusal to receive an alien system. Prior to
its incorporation into the United States, Texas was a republic with a
legal system based, in large part, on civil law inherited from the Spanish. Even before incorporation into the United States, the common
law was received and, in most areas of the law, quickly supplanted the
civilian tradition. In the area of procedure, however, the reception
was not so smooth. In fact, the judges of the Texas Supreme Court
and the new Congress of Texas refused to accept wholly the rules of
common law pleading, but, instead, retained the older, already in
place, civilian tradition of pleading by petition and answer. 33
The second example is more speculative. To some extent, the
twentieth-century reform of civil procedure in the federal courts is
traceable to a speech given before the American Bar Association by
Roscoe Pound at the turn of the century. 34 Pound, of course, was
soon thereafter to become dean of the Harvard Law School and one of
the foremost legal philosophers of his time. 35 But when he delivered
his speech arguing for a simplification of pleading rules and a reform
of civil procedure, he was primarily teaching and writing in the field of
Roman and civil laws. 36 Indeed, it is noteworthy, as the Texas judges
had realized a half century before, that the Roman law procedural
rules were far simpler and clearer than common law rules. Might one
suggest, therefore, that the intellectual genesis of Pound's ideas delivered to the ABA may have lain, partly, in his civilian studies?
Finally, one ancillary theme in Professor Watson's book deserves
mention. Watson believes that even when society does have a particular need, because of the intervention of a professional legal elite between society as a whole and its lawmaking processes, there is often a
considerable lag between the declaration of such a need and the creation of a legal rule to satisfy it. He cites, for instance, the fact that the
Roman jurists never finally determined the elements of the crime of
theft (pp. 33-35). Watson surmises that such a determination must
have been socially necessary, since such matters would need to be certain if theft were to be punished effectively.
Again, Professor Watson's insight here is valuable. It is a curious
33. See McKnight, The Spanish Influence on the Texas Law of Civil Procedure, 38 TEXAS L.
REv. 24, 26-31 (1959). It is interesting to note that the Spanish legal tradition as to marriage and
property was also retained here, in part perhaps because of both the lawyers' familiarity with it
and popular pressure.
34. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in 29
REPORT OF THE 29TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION 395 (1906).
35. The leading biography of Pound is P. SAYRE, THE LIFE OF ROSCOE POUND (1948).
36. Pound's course materials were published as R. POUND, READINGS IN ROMAN LAw AND
THE CIVIL LAW AND MODERN CODES AS DEVELOPMENTS THEREOF (2d ed. 1914).
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fact that a sophisticated legal system would leave basic questions unresolved. Watson's analysis suggests two possible explanations. First,
the role of the professional legal elite in the lawmaking process tends
to act as a filter of social demands, and the filtration process simply
tends to slow legal response. Second, and perhaps more interesting, the
professional legal elite will, on occasion, deliberately fail to respond to
a perceived social need for reasons of its own. This second possible
explanation is especially thought-provoking and leads one to consider
the themes worked out in Dean Guido Calabresi's A Common Law for
an Age of Statutes 37 and the last chapter of Professor Watson's own
Sources of Law, Legal Change, and Ambiguity. 38
There may be, however, a third possible explanation not explicitly
mentioned by Professor Watson. This is simply that any institution
with traditions of its own, including institutionalized professional
groups, will generally resist change. We have a number of such examples of institutional resistance to change, even where the need for
change is pressing and obvious, in the history of technology. In Elting
Morison's splendid book, Men, Machines, and Modern Times, 39 he recounts the history of a number of cases where the institutionalization
of the military establishment caused harmful resistance to change. One
example he cites is the history of the development and deployment of
continuous-aim firing for naval guns in the nineteenth century.40 This
technique was actually developed in the latter part of the nineteenth
century by a British naval officer of the line, Percy Scott. It made for a
remarkable improvement in the accuracy of naval guns. This was noticed by an American naval officer of the line, William Sims, who proceeded to report to Washington on this remarkable improvement.
However, the U.S. Navy refused to deploy the necessary devices, even
though it would have been of immense value in sea battles, because it
had not been developed through traditional channels and because it
was deemed to be too radical a change. For two years Sims fought the
naval bureaucracy. Finally, in a show of extraordinary courage, he
wrote directly to President Roosevelt, who personally ordered the
navy to give Sims' ideas a chance. Morison attributes this resistance
and the need for a deus ex machina to human nature, to the fact that
societies are protective of the status quo and view all changes with
suspicion.
The lesson Morison's case study offers for the legal historian is
clear. It may well be that part of the reason lawmaking, in societies
where a professional legal elite controls the legislative process, is slow
to respond to societal needs stems simply from the inherent conserva37. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR AN AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
38. A. WATSON, supra note 2, at 111-31.
39. E. MORISON, MEN, MACHINES, AND MODERN TIMES (1966).
40. Id. at 17-44.
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tism and self-interest of any tradition-bound group. Large groups
with institutionalized power generally do not welcome changes of any
sort. Changes are difficult to absorb and upset established tradition.
The phenomenon that Professor Watson describes is thus not necessarily a purely legal phenomenon at all, but may be a broader sociological phenomenon common to all similar situations and to all societies.
In conclusion, however, the importance of Professor Watson's vision of lawmaking and reception is apparent. His is a book which will
provoke debate and stimulate our search to understand basic legal
phenomena. As such it is an important contribution.

